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Essay 
Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons 
from the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown 
Steven L. Schwarcz† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Congress has been holding hearings on threats to the fi-
nancial system in response to the recent subprime1 mortgage 
meltdown and its impact on the mortgage-backed and other as-
set-backed securities markets and on credit markets generally.2 
Central banks and governments worldwide have likewise ex-
pressed concern about this crisis and its potential systemic ef-
fects.  
Initial remedial steps were focused on banks. The United 
States Federal Reserve Bank, for example, attempted to reduce 
the likelihood that this crisis might affect other financial mar-
kets and the economy by cutting both the discount rate, which 
is the interest rate the Federal Reserve charges a bank to bor-
row funds when a bank is temporarily short of funds,3 and the 
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College of Business Administration, and Corporate Governance Center); Uni-
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of Law (Centre for Banking & Financial Law), and a workshop on “Structured 
Finance and Loan Modification” at the United States Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland for comments. He also thanks Mark Covey for excellent research 
assistance. Copyright © 2008 by Steven L. Schwarcz. 
 1. The term “subprime” includes both loans to borrowers of dubious cre-
ditworthiness and very large loans to otherwise creditworthy borrowers. 
 2. See, e.g., Systemic Risk: Examining Regulators’ Ability to Respond to 
Threats to the Financial System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial 
Serv., 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Systemic Risk Hearing]. As this Essay 
was going to press, Congress enacted, and the President signed the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765.  
 3. See Greg Ip et al., Stronger Steps: Fed Offers Banks Loans Amid Cri-
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federal funds rate, which is the interest rate banks charge oth-
er banks on interbank loans.4 The European Central Bank and 
other central banks similarly cut the interest rate they charge 
to borrowing banks.5 
These steps, ironically, directly impacted banks, but not 
the financial markets whose very fall was weakening banks.6 In 
medical terms, it was as if a doctor were attempting to cure a 
patient by focusing on curing symptoms, not the underlying 
disease.7 Changes in monetary policy may not work quickly 
enough—or may be too weak—to quell panics, falling prices, 
and the potential for systemic collapse.8  
This somewhat anachronistic focus on banks, not markets, 
ignores new trends in the global marketplace. Increasingly, the 
financial system is characterized by disintermediation, which 
enables companies to access the ultimate source of funds, the 
capital markets, without going through banks or other financial 
intermediaries.9 An exclusive bank-focused approach simply 
 
sis, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2007, at A1. 
 4. See Greg Ip, Fed’s Rate Cut Could Be Last For a While, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 1, 2007, at A1. 
 5. See Randal Smith et al., How a Panicky Day Led the Fed to Act: Freez-
ing of Credit Drives Sudden Shift; Shoving to Make Trades, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
20, 2007, at A1. 
 6. Ip et al., supra note 3 (“[The Fed’s] discount window’s reach in the 
current crisis is limited by the fact that only banks can use it, and they aren’t 
the ones facing the greatest strains.”). 
 7. Cf. How Three Economists View a Financial Rescue Plan, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 22, 2008, at C4. In this article, the author states that the U.S. Treasury 
Department’s proposal to use government money to purchase mortgage-backed 
securities held by banks and other financial institutions was “the first serious 
attempt by government to cure the underlying financial disease and not mere-
ly its symptoms.” Id. The author goes on to state that financial institutions are 
in trouble “because of falling prices of mortgage-backed and other securities, 
requiring these institutions to market their securities down to the collapsed 
market prices . . . .” Id. 
 8. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Preventing a Panic, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., Feb. 11, 2008, at 63 (observing that “[l]ower interest rates promoted by 
the Federal Reserve Bank cannot fully counter the forces of credit and liquidi-
ty contraction” caused by the subprime mortgage crisis); see Seth Carpenter & 
Selva Demiralp, The Liquidity Effect in the Federal Funds Market: Evidence 
from Daily Open Market Operations, 38 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 901, 
918–19 (2006) (concluding that although a change in monetary policy can be-
gin to affect the cost of capital within a day, its full effects can take much 
longer); Serena Ng et al., Fed Fails So Far in Bid to Reassure Anxious Inves-
tors, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2007, at A1. 
 9. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Pur-
pose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1315 (2002). 
Capital markets are now the nation’s and the world’s most important sources 
of investment financing. See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., MAPPING THE GLOBAL 
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does not keep up with underlying changes in the financial sys-
tem.10 In a financially disintermediated world, the old protec-
tions are no longer reliable. 
This Essay seeks to understand what new protections are 
needed by exploring why the subprime financial crisis occurred, 
notwithstanding the array of existing protections included in 
financial regulation, market norms and customs, and the mar-
ket-discipline approach undertaken by the second Bush admin-
istration.11 The Essay begins by identifying anomalies and ob-
vious protections that failed to work. It then searches for 
lessons by examining various hypotheses of why these anoma-
lies and failures occurred.  
I.  IDENTIFYING ANOMALIES AND FAILURES   
The following represent anomalies arising from, and pro-
tections that failed to deter, the subprime mortgage meltdown: 
(A) disclosure provides investors with all the information they 
need to assess investments, yet many investors made poor deci-
sions; (B) securitization and other forms of structured finance 
(collectively, “structured finance”), pursuant to which mort-
gage-backed and other forms of asset-backed securities are is-
sued, are supposed to diversify and reallocate risk to parties 
best able to bear it, yet structured finance did not protect many 
investors in mortgage-backed securities; (C) the subprime 
mortgage meltdown originally related to subprime mortgage-
backed securities markets, but it quickly infected the markets 
for prime mortgage-backed securities and other asset-backed 
 
CAPITAL MARKET THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2007), available at http://www 
.mckinsey.com/mgi/reports/pdfs/third_annual_report/CapMarkets_perspective 
.pdf (reporting that as of the end of 2005, the value of total global financial as-
sets, including equities, government and corporate debt securities, and bank 
deposits, was $140 trillion). 
 10. Although there is some concern about capital levels at banks, the 
losses giving rise to this concern are not due to bad mortgage loans made by 
those banks but rather to investments in mortgage-backed securities or loans 
made to entities, such as hedge funds, holding mortgage-backed securities as 
assets. See infra note 64 (reporting on write-downs stemming from bad mort-
gage-backed securities); see also David Wessel, Magnifying the Credit Fallout, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2008, at A2 (discussing the erosion of the capital level at 
banks due to the falling value of bank-owned mortgage loans and mortgage-
backed securities). 
 11. See Anthony W. Ryan, Assistant Sec’y for Fin. Mkts., U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treasury, Remarks Before the Managed Funds Association Conference (June 
11, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp450 
.htm) (discussing the market-discipline approach). 
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securities;12 (D) the second Bush administration expected that 
its market-discipline approach, along with existing protections, 
would be sufficient to protect against financial market instabil-
ities, but this approach turned out to be insufficient; and (E) 
rating agencies purport to assess an investment’s safety, but 
they failed to anticipate the defaults. As this Essay will show, 
most of the causes of these anomalies and failures can be attri-
buted to conflicts of interest, investor complacency, and overall 
complexity, all exacerbated by cupidity.  
Examining hypotheses of why these anomalies and failures 
may have occurred requires explanation of certain structured 
finance terminology. The issuer of mortgage-backed and other 
forms of asset-backed securities in structured finance transac-
tions is typically a special-purpose vehicle, or “SPV” (also some-
times called a special-purpose entity, or “SPE”).13 These securi-
ties are customarily categorized as mortgage-backed securities 
(“MBS”), asset-backed securities (“ABS”), collateralized debt ob-
ligation (“CDO”), or ABS CDO.14 MBS are securities whose 
payment derives principally or entirely from mortgage loans 
owned by the SPV.15 ABS are securities whose payment derives 
principally or entirely from receivables or other financial as-
sets—other than mortgage loans—owned by the SPV.16 Indus-
try participants refer to transactions in which SPVs issue MBS 
or ABS as “securitization.”17 
The term “securitization” also technically includes CDO 
and ABS CDO transactions. CDO securities are backed by—
and thus their payment derives principally or entirely from—a 
mixed pool of mortgage loans and/or other receivables owned by 
an SPV.18 ABS CDO securities, in contrast, are backed by a 
mixed pool of ABS and/or MBS securities owned by the SPV, 
and thus their payment derives principally or entirely from the 
underlying mortgage loans and/or other receivables ultimately 
backing those ABS and MBS securities.19 For this reason, ABS 
 
 12. For an explanation of the types of securities involved in the subprime 
financial crisis, see infra notes 14–26 and accompanying text. 
 13. See JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF 
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 662–63 (7th ed. 2006). 
 14. There are arcane variations on the CDO categories, such as CDOs 
“squared” or “cubed,” but these go beyond this Essay’s analysis. 
 15. See DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 13, at 434–35. 
 16. See id. at 35. 
 17. See id. at 630. 
 18. See id. at 121. 
 19. “Synthetic” CDOs, which do not appear to be relevant to this Essay’s 
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CDO transactions are sometimes referred to as “re-
securitization.”  
Schematically, the distinctions among these categories can 
be portrayed as follows: 
 
 
The classes, or “tranches,” of MBS, ABS, CDO, and ABS 
CDO securities issued in these transactions are typically 
ranked by seniority of payment priority.20 The highest priority 
class is called senior securities.21 In MBS and ABS transac-
tions, lower priority classes are called subordinated, or junior, 
securities.22 In CDO and ABS CDO transactions, lower priority 
classes are usually called mezzanine securities23—with the 
lowest priority class, which has a residual claim against the 
SPV, called the equity.24 
 
analysis, own derivative instruments, such as credit-default swaps, rather 
than receivables, ABS, or MBS. 
 20. See DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 13, at 749. 
 21. See id. at 637. 
 22. See id. at 369. 
 23. See id. at 421. 
 24. In MBS and ABS transactions, the term “equity” is not generally used 
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The senior and many of the subordinated classes of these 
securities are more highly rated than the quality of the under-
lying receivables.25 For example, senior securities issued in a 
CDO transaction are usually rated AAA even if the underlying 
receivables consist of subprime mortgages, and senior securi-
ties issued in an ABS CDO transaction are usually rated AAA 
even if none of the MBS and ABS securities supporting the 
transaction are rated that highly. This is accomplished by allo-
cating cash collections from the receivables first to pay the se-
nior classes and thereafter to pay more junior classes (the so-
called “waterfall” of payment).26 In this way, the senior classes 
are highly overcollateralized to take into account the possibili-
ty, indeed likelihood, of delays and losses on collection. 
The subprime financial crisis occurred because, with home 
prices unexpectedly plummeting27 and adjustable-rate mort-
gage (ARM) interest rates skyrocketing,28 many more borrow-
ers defaulted than anticipated,29 causing collections on sub-
prime mortgages to plummet below the original estimates. 
Thus, equity and mezzanine classes of securities were im-
paired, if not wiped out, and in many cases even senior classes 
 
because the company originating the securities (the “Originator”) usually 
holds, directly or indirectly, the residual claim against the SPV. See id. at 491 
(defining “originator”). 
 25. See id. at 121 (defining CDO as an investment-grade bond backed by a 
diversified pool of bonds including junk bonds). The equity class is generally 
not rated. 
 26. See Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/waterfallpay 
ment.asp (last visited Sept. 20, 2008) (defining waterfall payment as “[a] type 
of payment scheme in which higher-tiered creditors receive interest and prin-
cipal payments, while the lower-tiered creditors receive only interest pay-
ments. When the higher tiered creditors have received all interest and prin-
cipal payments in full, the next tier of creditors begins to receive interest and 
principal payments”). 
 27. See Kemba J. Dunham & Ruth Simon, Refinancing May be Harder to 
Enjoy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2007, at B1 (discussing the difficulty of refinanc-
ing due to tighter lending standards and falling home prices). 
 28. Rick Brooks & Constance Mitchell Ford, The United States of Sub-
prime, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2007, at A1 (analyzing high-rate mortgages). Al-
though rate increases on ARM loans (through rate resets) were not per se un-
expected, the end of the liquidity glut made it harder for subprime borrowers 
to refinance into loans with lower, affordable interest rates. See id. 
 29. Anthony B. Sanders, Bob Herberger Ariz. Heritage Chair Professor of 
Fin., Ariz. State Univ., Incentives and Failures in the Structured Finance 
Market: The Case of the Subprime Mortgage Market, Presentation to the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Cleveland Workshop: Structured Finance and Loan Mod-
ification (Nov. 20, 2007) (notes on file with author). But cf. Ruth Simon, Rising 
Rates to Worsen Subprime Mess, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2007, at A1 (reporting 
that many mortgages defaulted even before interest rates increased). 
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were impaired.30 Investors in these securities lost billions,31 
creating a loss of confidence in the financial markets.32 
II.  SEARCHING FOR LESSONS   
A. IF DISCLOSURE PROVIDES INVESTORS WITH ALL THE 
INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSESS INVESTMENTS, WHY DID SO 
MANY INVESTORS MAKE POOR DECISIONS?  
To explain this anomaly and failure, this Essay examines 
several hypotheses: 
Hypothesis: The disclosure was inadequate because 
the depth of the fall of the housing market exceeded 
reasonable worst-case scenarios. Mortgage loans, which 
were the asset class supporting the MBS as well as a 
significant portion of the CDO and ABS CDO securities, 
therefore, turned out to be severely undercollateralized 
in many cases. 
Any failure to envision the worst-case scenario that re-
sulted from the fall of the housing market may have reflected, 
to some extent, a failure to take a sufficiently long view of risk. 
Some explain the near collapse of Long-Term Capital Manage-
ment (LTCM), a hedge fund that lost hundreds of millions of 
dollars in 1998, as a result of this type of failure.33 Investors 
and other market participants looked to the recent past to form 
predictions about home prices,34 but they did not always look to 
worst-case possibilities, such as the experience of the Great 
Depression.35 
 
 30. See Carrick Mollenkamp & Serena Ng, Wall Street Wizardry Ampli-
fied Credit Crisis: A CDO Called Norma Left ‘Hairball of Risk’; Tailored by 
Merrill Lynch, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2007, at A1 (reporting on the downgrade 
of one CDO’s AAA rated tranches to junk status). 
 31. See id. 
 32. Reference in this article to “investors” means investors in capital mar-
ket securities, not investors in the homes financed by the mortgage loans ul-
timately backing such securities. 
 33. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Rashomon in Connecticut: What Really Hap-
pened to Long-Term Capital Management?, SLATE, Oct. 2, 1998, http://www 
.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=1908. 
 34. Jack Guttentag, Shortsighted About the Subprime Disaster, WASH. 
POST, May 26, 2007, at F2 (explaining that because housing prices had been 
rising for a long period of time, it was assumed that they would continue to 
rise). 
 35. See Christine Harper, Death of VaR Evoked as Risk-Taking Vim Meets 
Taleb’s Black Swan, BLOOMBERG.COM, Jan. 28, 2008, http://www.bloomberg 
.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=axo1oswvqx4s&refer=home (reporting that 
financial models at Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and UBS failed to foresee 
Schwarcz_MLR  
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These types of failures are inevitable, though, because the 
reasonableness of worst-case scenarios is assessed, necessarily, 
ex ante. It does not appear unreasonable, for example, to have 
viewed the Great Depression as unique.36 As Monty Python 
memorably put it (in a different context), “Nobody expects the 
Spanish Inquisition!”37 
Some failures to take a sufficiently long view of risk reflect 
behavioral bias due to associations with recent similar events.38 
Those failures are discussed separately. 
Hypothesis: The disclosure was adequate, but many 
investors failed to read it carefully enough or appreciate 
what they were reading. 
 
the decline in housing prices). See generally NASSIM TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: 
THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (2007) (discussing human tendency 
of failing to anticipate improbable events). One commentator suggests that the 
disclosure also did not adequately address the relatively illiquid nature of the 
securities: “It is true that the level of default was unusually high, but the bulk 
of the problem is coming from liquidity issues—no one wants to hold these [se-
curities], and if you try to find [a buyer] you have to trade them at a very low 
price.” E-mail from Richard Bookstaber, author, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DE-
SIGN, to author (Nov. 30, 2007, 08:11:08 EST) (on file with author). Lack of li-
quidity, however, appears to have been a standard disclosure item. See, e.g., 
Soundview Home Loan Trust, Prospectus Supplement (WMC1) (Mar. 12, 
2007), available at http://www.secinfo.com/dqTm6.uPa.htm: 
There is no assurance that . . . a secondary market [in the securities] 
will develop or, if it develops, that it will continue. Consequently, you 
may not be able to sell your [securities] readily or at prices that will 
enable you to realize your desired yield. The market values of the [se-
curities] are likely to fluctuate; these fluctuations may be significant 
and could result in significant losses to you.  
Id. at “Lack of Liquidity” subsection under “Risk Factors.” I therefore believe 
that the problem was less issuer failure to disclose the illiquidity risk than in-
vestor failure to appreciate that disclosure. See infra notes 38–51 and accom-
panying text. Query, however, whether anyone knew—much less knew enough 
to disclose—the extent of the illiquidity problem. See E-mail from Bookstaber, 
supra (“[N]o one knew how levered [sic] funds were, and therefore how quickly 
they would need to dump [securities] if they faced a market shock.”).  
 36. But cf. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, The Consequences of Mortgage Credit 
Expansion: Evidence from the 2007 Subprime Mortgage Default Crisis 1, 4 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13936), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13936 (arguing that investors and rating agen-
cies likely did not fully appreciate that the mortgage supply expansion itself 
was in part driving house price appreciation). In other words, Professors Mian 
and Sufi argue that home prices dropped radically, as a percentage, once 
mortgage money tightened, and that investors and rating agencies should 
have anticipated that possibility. See id. 
 37. Monty Python’s Flying Circus: The Spanish Inquisition (BBC televi-
sion broadcast Sept. 22, 1970). 
 38. See infra notes 48–51 and accompanying text (discussing herd beha-
vior and the availability heuristic). 
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This hypothesis has several possible subhypotheses ex-
plaining the ultimate failure. The first is overreliance: inves-
tors may have relied heavily, and perhaps in some cases exclu-
sively, on third parties, in making important investment 
decisions. For example, one commentator argues that investors 
overrelied on the underwriter or arranger selling them the se-
curities: 
Investors have the prospectus to rely on, but the reality is that they 
have not taken any responsibility for reading the detail of the docu-
mentation or digesting the risks involved. These investors are still 
under the impression that the arranger will look after their interests 
and are yet to appreciate the need to negotiate what are highly com-
plicated bilateral agreements.39 
Because this interpretation of investor behavior flies in the 
face of caveat emptor (“buyer beware”), it seems dubious that 
investors would depend so heavily on sellers of securities, un-
less the underwriter/arranger’s interests were aligned with 
that of the investors.40 Those interests were somewhat aligned, 
however, in ABS CDO transactions where underwriters custo-
marily purchased some portion of the equity tranches, at least 
in part, to demonstrate their (subsequently unjustified) confi-
dence in the securities being sold. Ironically, this created a mu-
tual-misinformation problem: aligning the interests of sellers 
and investors actually worked against investor caution. 
Investors also may have overrelied on rating-agency rat-
ings, without necessarily engaging in, or at least fully perform-
ing, their own due diligence.41 Even if investors performed their 
own due diligence, agency-cost conflicts42 and lack of economy 
of scale43 may have limited the extent to which they could have 
done a better job of assessing creditworthiness than the rating 
agencies. 
 
 39. Daniel Andrews, The Clean Up: Investors Need Better Advice on Struc-
tured Finance Products, 26 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 14 (2007), http://search.ebscohost 
.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=26885198&site=ehost-live. 
 40. This form of the hypothesis, of course, is now even more dubious as a 
predictor of (at least near-term) future investor reliance. 
 41. This Essay later examines why rating agencies failed to anticipate the 
downgrades. See infra Part II.E. 
 42. See infra notes 59–63 and accompanying text. 
 43. Individual investors face relatively high costs to assess the creditwor-
thiness of complex ABS, CDO, and ABS CDO securities, whereas rating agen-
cies make this assessment on behalf of many individual investors, thereby 
achieving an economy of scale. See infra notes 52–53 and accompanying text 
(discussing the complexity of these types of transactions and the volume of as-
sociated disclosure documents). 
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Another subhypothesis is that, as a result of a market bub-
ble, “many investors, swept up in the euphoria of the moment, 
failed to pay close attention to what they were buying.”44 Bub-
bles can start quite easily. If, for example, a particular stock 
unexpectedly gains in value, the losers (e.g., those shorting the 
stock) will tend to withdraw from that market, and the winners 
will tend to increase their investment, driving up the price even 
further. Soon, other winners are attracted to the stock, and 
other losers cut their losses and stop shorting the stock. This 
process is aided by commentators’ explanations of why it is ra-
tional for the price to keep going up, and why the traditional 
relationship of price to earnings does not apply. Even investors 
who recognize the bubble as irrational may buy in, hoping to 
sell at the height of the bubble before it bursts.45 In these ways, 
price movements can become somewhat self-sustaining.46 
Bubbles are an old phenomenon. Compare the “tulip bub-
ble” in seventeenth century Holland, in which certain tulips 
were highly prized, and their bulbs were sold for thousands of 
guilder. Almost everyone got caught up in the excitement of 
buying and selling tulip bulbs, usually on credit and with the 
intention of making a quick profit; but many who speculated on 
credit were left with crushing debts when the market finally 
crashed.47 Occasional bubbles may well be an inevitable side ef-
fect of a market economy. 
A third subhypothesis explaining investor actions is the 
notion of bounded rationality imposed by human cognitive limi-
tations. Bubbles do not necessarily require individual investors 
to behave irrationally. In contrast, investors can make poor de-
cisions, notwithstanding disclosure, because of their cognitive 
limitations. There are at least two ways in which this can oc-
cur. To some extent, investor failure in the subprime financial 
crisis may have resulted from herd behavior.48 It may also have 
 
 44. Alan S. Blinder, Six Fingers of Blame in the Mortgage Mess, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007, § 3 (Business), at 4. 
 45. See Sam Segal, Tulips Portrayed: The Tulip Trade in Holland in the 
17th Century, in THE TULIP 17–19 (Michael Roding & Hans Theunissen eds., 
1993) (noting that all levels of the population from the weaver to the aristocrat 
were buying tulips at staggering prices in hopes of making a profit from the 
“tulip mania”). 
 46. RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, 
HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 169–70 (2007). 
 47. Segal, supra note 45, at 19. 
 48. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a 
World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (observing and explaining 
this behavior in a related context). 
  
2008] PROTECTING FINANCIAL MARKETS 383 
 
resulted from the availability heuristic, under which people 
overestimate the frequency or likelihood of an event when ex-
amples of, or associations with, similar events are easily 
brought to mind.49 People typically overestimate the divorce 
rate, for example, if they can quickly find examples of divorced 
friends.50 Similarly, once past financial crises recede in memo-
ry, and investors are making money, investors always “go for 
the gold.”51 
Hypothesis: The disclosure was inherently inade-
quate because the transactions were so complex that 
many investors could not understand them.52 
This hypothesis turns on the extraordinary complexity of 
CDO and ABS CDO transactions. The prospectus itself in a 
typical offering of these securities can be hundreds of pages 
long.53 This hypothesis, if true, would extend the thesis in my 
article, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of 
Complexity,54 beyond investors in an Originator’s55 securities to 
investors in an SPV’s securities. Although that article con-
cerned investors in an Originator’s securities, the proposal of 
that article nonetheless can help to inform this analysis. That 
 
 49. Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, 
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 463, 465 (Daniel 
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Cf. Larry Light, Bondholder Beware: Value Subject to Change Without 
Notice, BUS. WK., Mar. 29, 1993, at 34 (discussing that within years after the 
“Marriott split,” investors favor higher interest rates over “event risk” cove-
nants, once the examples of events justifying the covenants have receded in 
memory). “Bondholders can—and will—fuss all they like. But the reality is, 
their options are limited: Higher returns or better protection. Most investors 
will continue to go for the gold.” Id. 
 52. See, e.g., Aaron Lucchetti & Serena Ng, Credit & Blame: How Rating 
Firms’ Calls Fueled Subprime Mess, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2007, at A10 (“A lot 
of institutional investors bought [mortgage-backed] securities substantially 
based on their ratings [without fully understanding what they bought], in part 
because the market has become so complex.”); see also Blinder, supra note 44 
(arguing that the MBS, especially the CDOs, “were probably too complex for 
anyone’s good”); Malcolm Gladwell, Open Secrets: Enron, Intelligence, and the 
Perils of Too Much Information, NEW YORKER, Jan. 8, 2007, at 44–53 (distin-
guishing between transactions that are merely “puzzles” and those that are 
truly “mysteries”). To the extent complexity is merely a puzzle, investment 
bankers theoretically could understand it. See id. at 46 (stating why puzzles 
are easier to solve than mysteries). 
 53. The disclosure documents ordinarily consist of a prospectus and a 
prospectus supplement, each close to 200 pages long. 
 54. Schwarcz, supra note 48, at 7. 
 55. For a definition of “Originator,” see supra note 24. 
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article proposes that investors in an Originator’s securities be 
protected in a supplementary manner by restricting conflicts of 
interest in complex transactions for which disclosure would be 
insufficient.56 The rationale is that, absent conflicts, the Origi-
nator’s management will make decisions that more closely re-
flect the interests of the Originator’s investors.  
The same approach has potential application to investors 
in an SPV’s securities, particularly when the SPV transaction 
is so complex (as some CDO and ABS CDO transactions appar-
ently were) that disclosure would be insufficient. In that con-
text, there are at least two ways in which material conflicts 
arise. For securities backed by subprime mortgages, the inter-
ests of mortgage originators, absent their taking a prior or pari 
passu (“equal and ratable”) risk of loss,57 are misaligned with 
that of investors in those securities.58 To mitigate this type of 
conflict, perhaps mortgage originators should be required to 
take some risk of loss. 
Secondly, agency-cost conflicts arise when the interests of 
individual investment bankers, who structure, sell, or invest in 
securities, are misaligned with the interests of the institutions 
for which they work.59 For example, certain losses of institu-
tional investors such as Bear Stearns appear to have resulted 
from losses in CDO investments by controlled or managed 
hedge funds.60 If managers of those hedge funds were paid ac-
cording to hedge-fund industry custom—in which “fund man-
agers reap large rewards on the upside without a corresponding 
punitive downside”61—they would have had significant conflicts 
 
 56. Schwarcz, supra note 48, at 30. See also id. at 32–33 (showing how to 
identify these transactions, which are defined as “disclosure-impaired transac-
tions”). 
 57. If mortgage originators take a risk of loss prior to, or pari passu (i.e., 
equal and ratable) with, investor risk of loss, their incentives would be aligned 
with investor incentives. 
 58. See infra notes 70–83 and accompanying text. 
 59. Most investors were institutions. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF 
REPORT: ENHANCING DISCLOSURE IN THE MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 
MARKETS (2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/mortgagebacked.htm (re-
porting that investors in MBS are “overwhelmingly institutional”). 
 60. See, e.g., Kate Kelly et al., Two Big Funds At Bear Stearns Face Shut-
down, WALL. ST. J., June 20, 2007, at A1. 
 61. James Surowiecki, Performance-Pay Perplexes, NEW YORKER, Nov. 12, 
2007, at 34. Hedge funds sometimes impose a limited punitive downside by 
ensuring that managers who lose money may not receive future bonuses until 
they subsequently make money above a “high water mark.” MARK J. P. ANSON, 
THE HANDBOOK OF ALTERNATIVE ASSETS 361 (2002). Generally, however, 
there is no clawback of past bonuses, so these managers can go to another 
  
2008] PROTECTING FINANCIAL MARKETS 385 
 
of interest with the institutions owning the hedge funds.62 To 
mitigate this type of conflict, these individuals should be paid 
in a manner that better aligns their interests with the interests 
of the institutions for which they work. 
Restricting conflicts of interest, as a supplement to disclo-
sure, is only a second-best solution. It would not solve the prob-
lem that, even absent conflicts, individual investment bankers 
might have insufficient incentives to try to completely under-
stand the highly complex transactions in which they recom-
mend their institutions invest. For example, such individuals 
might not choose to fully comprehend complex transactions be-
cause they view the possibility of losses as remote, or anticipate 
being in a new job if and when losses occurred, or simply feel 
safe following the herd of other bankers.63 
There do not appear to be any perfect solutions to the prob-
lem of investor ignorance of complex transactions. Government 
already takes a somewhat paternalistic stance to mitigate dis-
closure inadequacy by mandating minimum investor sophisti-
cation for investing in complex securities; yet sophisticated in-
vestors and qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) are the very 
investors who lost the most money in the subprime financial 
crisis.64 And any attempt by government to restrict firms from 
engaging in complex transactions would be highly risky be-
cause of the potential of inadvertently banning beneficial 
transactions.65 
 
hedge fund where they will not be subject to this liability. Id. at 85 
(“[C]lawbacks are rare in the hedge fund world.”). 
 62. In this regard, the reader should distinguish these conflicts of interest 
not only from the agency-cost problem discussed above but also from the po-
tential conflict of interest between mortgage originators and investors dis-
cussed in footnotes 70–83 and accompanying text. 
 63. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 48, at 2, 14–15. Outside of an institu-
tional-industry context, there may be further misalignment of incentives be-
cause of higher employee turnover. Id. at 14 (observing that employee turno-
ver reduces accountability). 
 64. See, e.g., Jenny Anderson, Wall St. Banks Confront a String of Write-
Downs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2008, at C1 (“[M]ajor banks . . . have already 
written off more than $120 billion of losses stemming from bad mortgage-
related investments.”); Randall Smith, Merrill’s $5 Billion Bath Bares Deeper 
Divide, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 2007, at A4 (reporting a total of $20 billion in 
write-downs by large investment banks). 
 65. Cf. infra note 74 and accompanying text (cautioning against “throwing 
out the baby with the bathwater”). Although otherwise beyond this article’s 
scope, certain CDO products, the so-called CDOs “squared” and “cubed,” might 
be worthy of special consideration because they are subject to “cliff risk,” or 
suddenly losing 100% of their value. See, e.g., MICHIKO WHETTEN & MARK 
ADELSON, NOMURA FIXED INCOME RESEARCH, CDOS-SQUARED DEMYSTIFIED 
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Hypothesis: Even when disclosure is adequate and 
investors understand it perfectly (i.e., they have perfect 
knowledge of the risk), disclosure alone will be inade-
quate to address at least systemic risk in financial mar-
kets. 
Systemic risk is the risk that an economic shock such as 
market or institutional failure triggers (through a panic or oth-
erwise) either by (i) the failure of a chain of markets or institu-
tions or (ii) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, 
resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its 
availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market 
price volatility.66 Disclosure alone will be inadequate to pre-
vent systemic risk because, like a tragedy of the commons, the 
benefits of exploiting finite capital resources accrue to individ-
ual market participants, each of whom is motivated to maxim-
ize use of the resource, whereas the costs of exploitation, which 
affect the real economy, are distributed among an even wider 
class of persons.67 Investors are therefore unlikely to care about 
disclosure to the extent it pertains to systemic risk. 
Should disclosure therefore be supplemented to address 
systemic risk? I address this in a separate article,68 proposing, 
among other things, a “market” liquidity provider of last resort 
to purchase securities in collapsing markets in order to miti-
gate market instability that would lead to systemic collapse. 
Such a liquidity provider would supplement disclosure by mak-
ing its purchases at a deep enough discount to (i) make a profit, 
or at least be repaid, and (ii) mitigate moral hazard by impair-
ing speculative investors.69 
 
12–13 (2005), http://www.math.ust.hk/~maykwok/courses/MAFS521_07/CDO- 
Squared_Nomura.pdf; Janet Tavakoli, Leverage and Junk Science: A Credit 
Crunch Cocktail, TOTAL SECURITIZATION, Sept. 20, 2007, http://www 
.totalsecuritization.com. In this context, the tort law doctrine of “unavoidably 
unsafe products” may help to inform a regulatory analysis. In tort law, an 
“unavoidably unsafe product” is subject to strict liability unless its utility out-
weighs its risk. Joanne Rhoton Galbreath, Annotation, Products Liability: 
What Is an “Unavoidably Unsafe” Product, 70 A.L.R. 4th 34 (1989). For exam-
ple, the vaccine for rabies is inherently dangerous, but rabies can result in 
death, so the vaccine is not subject to strict liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). 
 66. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 196–97 
(2008). 
 67. In other words, the externalities of systemic failure include social 
costs that can extend far beyond market participants. Id. at 208–09.  
 68. See id. at 228–30, 248–49. 
 69. Id. 
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Summary: The discussion above suggests that multiple 
causes, viewed collectively, explain why so many investors 
make poor investment decisions notwithstanding disclosure. 
Some investors may have taken too short-sighted a view of risk 
in the housing market or have been swayed by the fact that, in 
recent memory, home prices had only been rising. Some inves-
tors may have simply followed the herd in their investments, 
while others—possibly recognizing the bubble forming in the 
market for CDO and ABS CDO securities—may have invested 
anyway, hoping prices would continue to rise and their invest-
ments would rise in value. Investors also may have relied ex-
cessively on credit ratings without performing their own due 
diligence. In the case of investments in ABS CDO transactions, 
investors additionally may have over-relied on the judgment of 
underwriters who had purchased portions of the “equity” 
tranches. Finally, certain of the CDO and ABS CDO transac-
tions may have been so complex that disclosure was inherently 
inadequate. 
B. IS THERE SOMETHING STRUCTURALLY WRONG ABOUT HOW 
STRUCTURED FINANCE WORKED IN THE MORTGAGE CONTEXT?  
For this anomaly, this Essay examines several hypotheses: 
Hypothesis: Structured finance facilitated an undis-
ciplined mortgage lending industry characterized by 
ease of entrance by enabling mortgage lenders to sell off 
loans as they were made (a concept called “originate-
and-distribute”). This created moral hazard to the ex-
tent that mortgage lenders did not have to live with the 
credit consequences of their loans. For that reason, 
probably exacerbated by the fact that mortgage lenders 
could make money on the volume of loans originated,70 
the underwriting standards of mortgage lenders fell.71 
 
 70. This may have been further exacerbated by certain mortgage lenders 
without balance-sheet assets simply advancing to borrowers the proceeds of 
selling the loans. Confidential Interview with a monoline insurance executive 
(Oct. 18, 2007) (notes on file with author). 
 71. See, e.g., Legislative and Regulatory Options for Minimizing and Miti-
gating Mortgage Foreclosures: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial 
Serv., 110th Cong. 74 (2007) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board 
of Governors, Fed. Reserve System). There is also speculation that some mort-
gage-loan originators might have engaged in fraud by manipulating borrower 
income, and that some borrowers may have engaged in fraud by lying about 
their income, in each case to qualify borrowers for loans. See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj, 
A Cross-Country Blame Game, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2007, at C4. If such fraud 
occurred, it would exacerbate but is unlikely to be significant enough to have 
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Anecdotal evidence suggests this hypothesis is at least 
somewhat true.72 One solution would be to limit the originate-
and-distribute model.73 However, that would be like “throwing 
out the baby with the bathwater” as an originate-and-distribute 
model is critical to the underlying funding liquidity of banks74 
as well as many corporations.75 
A better solution, already discussed, would be to require 
mortgage lenders and other originators to retain a risk of loss.76 
In many nonmortgage securitization transactions, for example, 
it is customary for originators to bear a direct risk of loss by 
overcollateralizing the receivables sold to the SPV.77 This is not 
always done in mortgage securitization because mortgage loans 
are inherently overcollateralized by the value of the real-estate 
collateral, and thus investors can effectively be overcollatera-
lized even if the originator bears no risk of loss. However, ori-
ginators should be required to retain a risk of loss to mitigate 
moral hazard. In this context, one might ask why investors and 
other parties, such as credit insurers, who ultimately bear the 
risk of loss in an originate-and-distribute model do not monitor 
the underlying loans. Although in theory they should, the prac-
 
caused the subprime financial crisis. 
 72. See Gary B. Gorton, The Panic of 2007, at 68 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 14358, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w14358.pdf (stating that the originate-and-distribute model and result-
ing moral hazard are the “dominant explanation” for the financial panic). To 
some extent, the drop in underwriting standards under the originate-and-
distribute model may reflect distortions caused by the recent liquidity glut, in 
which lenders competed aggressively for business and allowed otherwise de-
faulting borrowers to refinance. See Ravi Balakrishnan et al., Globalization, 
Gluts, Innovation or Irrationality: What Explains the Easy Financing of the 
U.S. Current Account Deficit? 5 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 
07/160, 2007), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/ 
wp07160.pdf (discussing this liquidity glut). 
 73. This model is also referred to as “originate to distribute.” 
 74. See, e.g., Joseph R. Mason, Assoc. Professor of Fin. & LeBow Research 
Fellow, Lebow Coll. of Bus., Drexel Univ., Presentation to the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Cleveland: Mortgage Loan Modification: Promises and Pitfalls (Nov. 
20, 2007) (presentation notes on file with author) (showing that fifty-eight per-
cent of mortgage liquidity in the United States, and seventy-five percent of 
mortgage liquidity in California has come from structured finance). 
 75. See Xudong An et al., Value Creation Through Securitization: Evi-
dence from the CMBS Market 3 (SSRN Working Paper No. 1095645, 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1095645 (con-
cluding that despite the recent mortgage crisis, securitization has created val-
ue in the financial markets). 
 76. See supra text accompanying notes 57–58. 
 77. See Vincent Ryan, Debt in Disguise, CFO MAG., Nov. 2007, at 80 (re-
porting that most securitization agreements include overcollateralization). 
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tical limits suggested by this Essay—including complexity of 
disclosure, herd behavior, and, as will be discussed, possible ex-
cessive diversification of risk that undermines any given inves-
tor’s incentive to monitor78—help to explain this failure to mon-
itor.79 
Some investors take comfort in the limited risk of loss im-
posed on mortgage originators through representations and 
warranties.80 Representations and warranties, however, are not 
always effective because they are costly to enforce and become 
illusory when mortgage originators are unable, as in the cur-
rent subprime mortgage meltdown, to pay damages for 
breach.81 Prudent investors should insist that mortgage origi-
nators retain some direct risk of loss to mitigate moral ha-
zard.82 For this same reason, for example, banks buying loan 
participations insist that the bank originating the loan retain a 
minimum portion, typically at least ten percent of the loan ex-
posure, even if the loan itself is overcollateralized.83  
Another possible solution is to regulate the loan underwrit-
ing standards applicable to mortgage lenders. This approach 
would be akin to the Federal margin regulations G, U, T, and X 
imposed in response to the 1929 stock market crash.84 The 
 
 78. See infra notes 87–89 and accompanying text. 
 79. The failure to monitor also can be explained by systematic underesti-
mation of the risk by all market players. See, e.g., Oz Ergungor, The Mortgage 
Debacle and Loan Modification 7–8 (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author). 
 80. Sanders, supra note 29. 
 81. Cf. id. (arguing that mortgage originators be required to post capital 
to backstop their representations and warranties for loans originated and then 
sold). Representations and warranties are even more patently illusory for 
mortgage originators lacking assets, who simply advance to borrowers the 
proceeds of selling the loans. See supra note 70. 
 82. The market actually was beginning to adjust in this fashion shortly 
before the subprime mortgage crisis started. See Jon D. Van Gorp, Capital 
Markets Dispersion of Subprime Mortgage Risk 10 (Nov. 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) (observing that, at the beginning of 2007, 
“early payment default protection became standardized across the market,” 
requiring loan originators to repurchase loans that fail to make any of their 
first two or three scheduled payments). Obligations to repurchase can become 
ineffective, however, when so many loans default that the obligor is unable to 
make its required repurchases. Ergungor, supra note 79, at 4–5.  
 83. In the author’s experience, this observation is accurate. Cf. Blinder, 
supra note 44 (suggesting that mortgage-loan originators “retain a share of 
each mortgage”); supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text (discussing un-
derwriters retaining a portion of the equity when selling ABS CDO securities). 
 84. Cf. Blinder, supra note 44 (suggesting a “suitability standard” for sell-
ing mortgage products and that all mortgage lenders be placed under federal 
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then-falling stock values caused margin loans—that is, loans to 
purchase publicly listed, or margin stock—to become undercol-
lateralized, causing bank lenders to fail. To protect against a 
recurrence of this problem, the margin regulations require 
margin lenders to maintain two-to-one overcollateralization 
when securing their loans by margin stock that has been pur-
chased, directly or indirectly, with the loan proceeds.85 
Imposing a minimum real-estate-value-to-loan overcollate-
ralization on all mortgage loans secured by the real estate fi-
nanced would likewise protect against a repeat of the subprime 
mortgage problem. Unfortunately, though, it would have a high 
price, potentially impeding and increasing the cost of home 
ownership and imposing an administrative burden on lenders 
and government monitors.86 
Hypothesis: Structured finance dispersed subprime 
mortgage risk so widely that there was no clear incen-
tive for any given investor to monitor it. 
 
regulation). 
 85. 12 C.F.R. § 221.3 (2008). 
 86. One might also consider imposing lending “suitability” standards and 
predatory-lending restrictions. For example, North Carolina’s Home Loan Pro-
tection Act, among other things, mandates that lenders verify borrower in-
come and also review the borrower’s ability to repay the loan after introducto-
ry rates adjust upwards. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E (2007) (amended by 2008 
N.C. Sess. Laws). The U.S. Congress also has considered mortgage suitability 
standards and anti-predatory-lending restrictions. See, e.g., Mortgage Reform 
and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. (2007). There is dis-
pute, however, over whether the North Carolina law has negatively impacted 
home ownership. Compare Raphael W. Bostic et al., State and Local Anti-
Predatory Lending Laws: The Effect of Legal Enforcement Mechanisms, 60 J. 
ECON. & BUS. 47, 50 (2008) (lending evidence that anti-predatory-lending laws 
have not curtailed credit mortgage markets), and Nanette Byrnes, These 
Tough Lending Laws Could Travel, BUS. WK., Nov. 5, 2007, at 70 (reporting 
that North Carolina’s housing market has not, according to “academic stu-
dies,” been negatively impacted), and ROBERTO G. QUERCIA ET AL., CTR. FOR 
COMMUNITY CAPITALISM, THE IMPACT OF NORTH CAROLINA’S ANTI-
PREDATORY LENDING LAW: A DESCRIPTIVE ASSESSMENT (2003), http://www 
.planning.unc.edu/pdf/CC_NC_Anti_Predatory_Law_Impact.pdf (stating that 
since the law was passed, there has been a reduction in predatory loans, but 
there has been “no change in the cost of subprime credit or reduction in access 
to credit for high-risk borrowers”), with Byrnes, supra (reporting that groups 
such as the Mortgage Bankers Association argue that tough loan underwriting 
standards will prevent needy borrowers from obtaining mortgage loans). Some 
argue also that the “borrowers are not victims of inappropriate loan prospect-
ing (such as predatory lending). Rather, they [or, at least, many] were willful 
participants.” Sanders, supra note 29. But cf. Gretchen Morgenson, Blame the 
Borrowers? Not So Fast, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, § 3 (Business), at 1. 
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Structured finance generally diversifies and reallocates 
risk, which is normally salutary.87 Might it have excessively 
dispersed subprime risk?88 
If this hypothesis is true, it would call into question wheth-
er incentives should be better aligned to promote monitoring, 
for example, by limiting the degree of risk dispersion. To some 
extent, this article already proposes a variant on that approach, 
by suggesting that loan originators in an originate-and-
distribute model retain some minimum percentage or amount 
of risk.89  
Hypothesis: Structured finance can make it difficult 
to work out problems with an underlying asset class—in 
this case, for example, making it difficult to work out 
the underlying mortgage loans because the beneficial 
owners of the loans are no longer the mortgage lenders 
but a broad universe of financial-market investors. As a 
result, mortgage defaults result in unnecessarily high 
losses.  
News stories observe that homeowners have been unable to 
restructure or modify their loans because they cannot identify 
who owns the loans.90 Laws protecting mortgage borrowers, 
 
 87. Douglas Elmendorf, Notes on Policy Responses to the Subprime Mort-
gage Unraveling, BROOKINGS INST., at 9 n.6, Sept. 17, 2007, http://www 
.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/09subprimemortgageunravelling/ 
09useconomics_elmendorf.pdf; see also Darrell Duffie, Innovations in Credit 
Risk Transfer: Implications for Financial Stability 1–2 (Bank for Int’l Settle-
ments, Paper No. 255, 2008), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work255 
.pdf?noframes=1 (arguing that instruments that transfer credit risk improve 
financial stability by dispersing risk among investors).  
 88. The very assumption that structured finance reallocates risk to par-
ties best able to bear it also may have failed in the subprime context. E-mail 
from Bookstaber, supra note 35 (“Rather than spreading the risk to those who 
were most comfortable holding the assets and taking the risk, many of the 
[holders] were ‘hot money’ hedge funds that would have to run for cover at the 
very time the risk taking function was most critical.”). 
 89. See supra text accompanying note 82 (arguing that prudent investors 
should insist that mortgage originators retain some direct risk of loss to miti-
gate moral hazard). 
 90. Gretchen Morgenson, More Home Foreclosures Loom as Owners Face 
Mortgage Maze, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at A1. A somewhat related issue is 
that, at least heretofore, individual borrowers could not use Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy to restructure their home mortgage-loan liabilities. See 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 1322(b)(2), 1332(b)(5) (2006). Bills have been introduced into both houses of 
Congress to amend Chapter 13 and allow for restructuring of home mortgages 
by bankruptcy courts. See Emergency Home Ownership and Mortgage Equity 
Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 3609, 110th Cong. (2007); Helping Families Save 
their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2008, S. 2136, 110th Cong. (2008). In a cor-
porate-reorganization context, however, debtors can, with the lender’s consent, 
Schwarcz_MLR  
392 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:373 
 
however, suggest this concern may be overstated. For example, 
the federal Truth in Lending Act states that, “[u]pon written 
request by the obligor, the servicer shall provide the obligor, to 
the best knowledge of the servicer, with the name, address, and 
telephone number of the owner of the obligation or the master 
servicer of the obligation.”91 
In theory, servicers bridge the gap between beneficial own-
ers of the loans and the mortgage lenders. It is typical, for ex-
ample, for originators of securitized mortgage loans, or a spe-
cialized servicing company such as Countrywide Home Loans 
Servicing LP, to act as the servicer for a fee.92 In this capacity, 
the servicer ordinarily retains power to restructure the under-
lying loans, so long as restructuring changes are “in the best in-
terests” of the investors holding the securities.93 Subject to that 
constraint, the servicer may even change the rate of interest, 
the principal amount of the loan, or the maturity dates of the 
loan if, for example, the loan is in default or, in the servicer’s 
judgment, default is reasonably foreseeable.94 
In practice, though, even when a servicer has the power to 
restructure a mortgage loan and restructuring is in the best in-
terests of investors, the servicer may be reluctant to engage in 
 
use bankruptcy to restructure their secured-loan liabilities. Cf. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1123(a)(5) (2006) (listing the contents of a bankruptcy plan); § 1126(c) (ac-
ceptance of a bankruptcy plan); § 1129(a)(7)–(8) (confirmation of a bankruptcy 
plan). 
 91. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(f )(2) (2006). Identification would be even less of a 
problem if the underlying receivables are not consumer assets, like mortgage 
loans, since the amounts involved in consumer receivables are typically rela-
tively small. 
 92. See JAMES A. ROSENTHAL & JUAN M. OCAMPO, SECURITIZATION OF 
CREDIT 49–51 (1988) (explaining the general structure of a grantor trust when 
the originator of asset-backed securities services the pool of assets); Gretchen 
Morgenson, Countrywide Is Upbeat Despite Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2007, at 
C1 (reporting that Countrywide is the nation’s largest loan servicer). In addi-
tion to a primary servicer, there are often other servicers involved in MBS 
transactions including a specialized servicer who services defaulted mortgage 
loans. See Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, Presentation to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission on the Proposed Asset-Backed Securities Rule (Sept. 23, 
2004), available at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s72104/mba092304.ppt. 
 93. Morgenson, supra note 90 (observing that a servicer might, for exam-
ple, be permitted to restructure only five percent of the loans). Sometimes, 
however, the servicer is limited as to the percentage of loans in a given pool 
that can be restructured. Id. 
 94. Financial Asset Securities Corp., Pooling and Service Agreement for 
Soundview Home Loan Trust Asset-Backed Certificates § 3.01 (Mar. 1, 2007), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1386634/00008823770700 
1029/d650626ex4_1.htm. 
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restructuring if there is uncertainty that the transaction will 
generate sufficient excess cash flow to reimburse the servicer’s 
costs.95 A mortgage loan servicer, for example, must “spend 
$750-$1000 to do a [loan] mod[ification] [and] can’t charge the 
borrower.”96 If there is insufficient excess cash, neither can it 
charge the securitization trust.97 By contrast, “all foreclosure 
costs are reimbursed.”98 Servicers also may sometimes prefer 
foreclosure over restructuring because the former is more mi-
nisterial and thus has lower litigation risk.99 The litigation risk 
of restructuring is exacerbated by the fact that, in many MBS, 
CDO, and ABS CDO transactions, cash flows deriving from 
principal and interest are separately allocated to different in-
vestor tranches.100 Therefore, a restructuring that, for example, 
reduces the interest rate would adversely affect investors in the 
interest-only tranche,101 leading to what some have called 
“tranche warfare.”102 
Summary: The discussion above indicates there is little 
structurally wrong about how structured finance worked in the 
mortgage context. Although the originate-and-distribute model 
of structured finance may have created a degree of moral ha-
zard, the model is critical to underlying funding liquidity. 
Moreover, the moral hazard cost can be mitigated if, as likely 
will occur in the future, investors learn from the subprime cri-
sis and require mortgage originators to retain a direct risk of 
loss beyond the sometimes illusory risk borne through repre-
sentations and warranties. 
 
 95. Mason, supra note 74 (observing that servicers will prefer to foreclose, 
even if it is not the best remedy, when foreclosure costs, but not modification 
costs, are reimbursed).  
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Kathleen C. Engel, Assoc. Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall Coll. 
of Law, Presentation to the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland: Modifications 
of Loans in Securitized Pools: Obstacles and Options (Nov. 20, 2007) (notes on 
this presentation on file with author). 
 100. Van Gorp, supra note 82, at 7–8. 
 101. The conflicts among tranches can become even more complicated be-
cause subprime MBS, CDO, and ABS CDO securities sometimes also include 
prepayment-penalty tranches, and the different tranches “have different prior-
ities relative to one another for the purpose of absorbing losses and prepay-
ments on the underlying subprime mortgage loans.” Id. at 8. 
 102. Telephone Interview with Alan Hirsch, Dir., N.C. Policy Office (Feb. 
20, 2008) (describing tranche conflicts as a significant reason why servicers 
choose foreclosure over restructuring). 
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Structured finance can make it more difficult to address 
problems with the underlying financial assets, but the in-
creased difficulty may be able to be managed. Parties should 
consider writing underlying deal documentation that sets 
clearer and more flexible guidelines and more certain reim-
bursement procedures for loan restructuring, especially when 
such restructuring is superior to foreclosure.103 Investors (and 
servicers) should prefer foreclosure to restructuring if restruc-
turing merely delays an inevitable foreclosure.104 
There nonetheless is a residual structural concern insofar 
as structured finance may have dispersed subprime mortgage 
risk so widely that there is no clear incentive for any given in-
vestor to monitor the risk. Whether that has occurred is uncer-
tain. Even if it has, the evil is not so much risk dispersion per 
se as the failure to align incentives sufficiently to promote mon-
itoring. 
C. WHY DID A PROBLEM WITH THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE-
BACKED SECURITIES MARKETS QUICKLY INFECT THE MARKETS 
FOR PRIME MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES AND OTHER ASSET-
BACKED SECURITIES?105  
Understanding this anomaly can help to expand an under-
standing of how market risk can become systemic. For this 
anomaly, this Essay examines several hypotheses: 
Hypothesis: The MBS, ABS, CDO, and ABS CDO mar-
kets are inherently tightly coupled, both within and 
among such markets. 
 
 103. In the current subprime crisis, of course, the underlying deal docu-
mentation is already in place. Because existing documentation cannot be easi-
ly renegotiated, the government might consider legislating changes. Any such 
changes that are subsidized in whole or part by government, however, could 
foster moral hazard, potentially making future homeowners more willing to 
take risks when borrowing. 
 104. Engel, supra note 99. 
 105. Cf. Andrews, supra note 39 (observing from the subprime financial 
crisis that “liquidity in markets for structured investments can disappear im-
mediately as soon as there are any shocks—no buying or selling at all in an 
entire sector,” though not explaining why this occurrs). A somewhat related 
question might be why the U.S. domestic real estate collapse is having a sig-
nificant impact overseas. The answer is that foreign investors purchased a 
significant amount of the CDO and ABS CDO securities backed (directly or 
indirectly) by such real estate. Jenny Anderson & Heather Timmons, Why a 
U.S. Subprime Mortgage Crisis Is Felt Around the World, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 
2007, at C1.  
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By “tight coupling,” I mean the tendency for financial mar-
kets to move rapidly into a crisis mode with little time or oppor-
tunity to intervene.106 Tight coupling could result from various 
mechanisms, even as elementary as investor panic, guilt-by-
association, or loss of confidence.107 In the subprime crisis, once 
investors realized that highly rated subprime mortgage-backed 
securities could lose money, they began shunning all complex 
securitization products.108 This pattern of behavior was particu-
larly true with respect to asset-backed commercial paper—not 
surprisingly, since commercial paper is effectively a substitute 
for cash (albeit one that yields a return). Investor reaction also 
may have been magnified by the dramatic shift away from the 
liquidity glut of the past few years, which had obscured the 
problem of defaults by enabling defaulting borrowers to refin-
ance with ease.109 
Tight coupling also may have been caused by a type of ad-
verse selection: investors were no longer sure which securitiza-
tion investments or counterparties were good and which were 
bad (CDO and ABS CDO products being especially difficult to 
value110), so they stopped investing in all securitization prod-
ucts.111 Incongruously, adverse selection may have been made 
 
 106. Thanks to Rick Bookstaber for this term. Bookstaber himself borrows 
it from engineering nomenclature. See Systemic Risk Hearing, supra note 2, at 
8 (statement of Richard Bookstaber). 
 107. See, e.g., Paul Davies & Gillian Tett, ‘A Flight to Simplicity’: Investors 
Jettison What They Do Not Understand, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 22, 2007, at 
9. 
 108. Cf. Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the 2007-08 Liquidity and 
Credit Crunch, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. (forthcoming Fall 2008), available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~markus/research/papers/liquidity_crunch_2007_08 
.pdf (speculating that when investors realized how difficult it was to value 
mortgage-structured products, the volatility of all structured products in-
creased). 
 109. Cf. supra note 72 and accompanying text (explaining that lenders 
competed aggressively for business during the recent liquidity glut, which al-
lowed otherwise defaulting borrowers to refinance). 
 110. Many CDO and ABS CDO products are valued by models rather than 
market price because they are issued in private placements and not freely 
traded. Valuation models are imperfect because they are based on assump-
tions. See Floyd Norris, Reading Write-Down Tea Leaves, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 
2007, at C1 (discussing the problems related to using valuation models). See 
generally Ingo Fender & John Kiff, CDO Rating Methodology: Some Thoughts 
on Model Risk and its Implications (Bank of Int’l. Settlements, Working Paper 
No. 163, 2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work163.htm (discussing 
the problems associated with the valuation models used by rating agencies). 
 111. See, e.g., Zuckerman, supra note 8, at 63 (stating that the “credit sys-
tem has been virtually frozen,” which poses a problem “since few people even 
know where the liabilities and losses are concentrated”). 
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worse by the otherwise salutary effect of securitization to dis-
perse risk: investors were unable, in part exacerbated by the 
indirect holding system for securities under which third parties 
cannot readily determine who ultimately owns specific securi-
ties,112 to ascertain to whom the risk was dispersed. 
Finally, and incongruously, tight coupling can even result 
from mark-to-market, or “fair value,” accounting. In its sim-
plest form, this is the common requirement that a securities ac-
count be adjusted in response to a change in the market value 
of the securities. An investor, for example, may buy securities 
on credit from a securities broker-dealer, securing the purchase 
price by pledging the securities as collateral. To guard against 
the price of the securities falling to the point where their value 
as collateral is insufficient to repay the purchase price, the bro-
ker-dealer requires the investor to maintain a minimum colla-
teral value. If the market value of the securities falls below this 
minimum, the broker-dealer will issue a “margin call” requiring 
the investor to deposit additional collateral, usually in the form 
of money or additional securities, to satisfy this minimum. 
Failure to do so triggers a default, enabling the broker-dealer to 
foreclose on the collateral.113 Requiring investors to mark prices 
to market value in this fashion is generally believed to reduce 
risk.114 Nonetheless, it can cause “perverse effects on systemic 
stability” during times of market turbulence, when forcing 
sales of assets to meet margin calls can depress asset prices, 
requiring more forced sales (which, in turn, will depress asset 
prices even more), causing a downward spiral.115 The existence 
 
 112. Under the indirect holding system for securities, intermediary entities 
hold securities on behalf of investors. Issuers of the securities generally record 
ownership as belonging to one or more depository intermediaries, which in 
turn record the identities of other intermediaries, such as brokerage firms or 
banks, that buy interests in the securities. Those other intermediaries, in 
turn, record the identities of investors that buy interests in the intermediaries’ 
interests. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk in a Global Economy, 50 
DUKE L.J. 1541, 1547–48 (2001). Because of this ownership chain, there is no 
single location from which third parties can readily determine who ultimately 
owns specific securities. Id. at 1583. 
 113. ZVI BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 78–79 (6th ed. 2005). 
 114. See, e.g., Gikas A. Hardouvelis & Panayiotis Theodossiou, The Asym-
metric Relation Between Initial Margin Requirements and Stock Market Vola-
tility Across Bull and Bear Markets, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 1525, 1554–55 (2002) 
(finding a correlation between higher margin calls and decreased systemic 
risk, and speculating that higher margin calls may bleed the irrationality out 
of the market until only sound bets are left). 
 115. See Rodrigo Cifuentes et al., Liquidity Risk and Contagion, BANK OF 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, at 2, Apr. 2, 2004, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ 
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of leverage makes this spiral more likely and amplifies it if it 
occurs.116 At least some portion of the subprime crisis appears 
to have been caused by this downward spiral.117 
Hypothesis: Tight coupling resulted from conver-
gence in hedge-fund quantitatively constructed invest-
ment strategies.118 
Professors Khandani and Lo hypothesize that when a 
number of hedge funds experienced unprecedented losses dur-
ing the week of August 6, 2007, they rapidly unwound sizable 
portfolios, likely based on a multistrategy fund or proprietary-
trading desk.119 These initial losses then caused further losses 
by triggering stop/loss and de-leveraging policies.120 To the ex-
tent this hypothesis has validity, hedge fund strategies, and not 
securitization or structured finance per se, are responsible for 
the subprime financial crisis. 
Summary: The discussion above provides three explana-
tions for why a problem with the subprime mortgage-backed 
securities markets quickly infected the prime markets.121 Faced 
 
events/rtf04shin.pdf; see also Clifford De Souza & Mikhail Smirnov, Dynamic 
Leverage: A Contingent Claims Approach to Leverage for Capital Conservation, 
J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 25, 28 (Fall 2004) (arguing that, in a bad market, short-
term pressure to sell assets to raise cash for margin calls can lead to further 
mark-to-market losses for remaining assets, which triggers a whole new wave 
of selling, the process repeating itself until markets improve or the firm is 
wiped out; and referring to this process as a “critical liquidation cycle”). 
 116. De Souza & Smirnov, supra note 115, at 26–27. 
 117. Rachel Evans, Banks Tell of Downward Spiral, 27 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 
16 (2008), http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN= 
33588387&site=ehost-live. 
 118. Cf. Schwarcz, supra note 66, at 202–04 (discussing the danger of con-
verging hedge-fund investment strategies). 
 119. Amir Khandani & Andrew W. Lo, What Happened to the Quants in 
August 2007? 2 (SSRN Working Paper No. 1015987, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1015987. 
 120. Id. Essentially, the authors argue that if shared models are wrong, an 
unanticipated error is shared by everyone. 
 121. There also might have been amplifying mechanisms that exacerbated 
or expanded market losses. For example, highly leveraged hedge funds appar-
ently borrowed money from banks and invested in significant amounts of 
MBS, CDO, and ABS CDO securities backed by subprime mortgages. See, e.g., 
Paul Davies & Gillian Tett, supra note 104 (reporting that hedge funds bor-
rowed large amounts of money to invest in CDO securities). Failure of these 
hedge funds resulting from losses on these securities can affect the bank lend-
ers. Another possible amplifying mechanism is that certain bank-sponsored 
investment conduits purchased AAA-rated CDO and ABS CDO securities with 
the proceeds of short-term commercial paper. As the CDO and ABS CDO se-
curities were marked down in value and investors failed to roll over their 
commercial paper, the bank sponsors faced the prospect of having to make 
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for the first time with the reality that highly rated tranches of 
subprime MBS could lose money, investors appear to have lost 
confidence, shunning all complex securitization products. To 
this extent, future investors should try to better understand 
these types of investments so that confidence is built on a fir-
mer foundation. 
Adverse selection also helps to explain the rapid infection. 
Investors became uncertain which securitization products, and 
indeed which securitization counterparties, were good and 
which were bad. They therefore stopped investing in all securi-
tization products. Adverse selection can be mitigated through 
information; in this case, by valuing the securities and ascer-
taining the holdings of securitization counterparties. However, 
because CDO and ABS CDO securities were not actively 
traded, and there was no established market price to which to 
mark them, these securities could not be valued at “market.” 
Valuation, therefore, was priced off quantitative models. Mark-
ing-to-model, however, creates intrinsic valuation uncertain-
ties, and indeed the valuations priced off those models proved 
hopelessly unreliable. The indirect holding system for securities 
also made it very difficult to ascertain whether CDO and ABS 
CDO securities were held by securitization counterparties, and 
as long as that system continues to dominate securities hold-
ings, this difficulty will remain. 
The third explanation is also related to valuation. Absent a 
real market, valuation of CDO and ABS CDO securities must, 
as indicated, be priced off quantitative models. It is critical, 
then, that the range of models used by investors be sufficiently 
diverse that errors in one model will not cut across all models. 
D. WHY WAS THE MARKET-DISCIPLINE APPROACH 
INSUFFICIENT? 
Under a market-discipline approach, the regulator’s job is 
to ensure that the private sector exercises the type of diligence 
that enables markets to work efficiently.122 Until recently, it 
 
payments to the conduits pursuant to liquidity and credit-enhancement facili-
ties. See Carrick Mollenkamp & Margot Patrick, Credit Crunch: Citigroup 
Moves to Quell SIV Concerns, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2007, at C2 (reporting that 
Citibank was unable to raise money through the sale of asset-backed commer-
cial paper); see also infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 122. Cf. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 2006 Financial Markets 
Conference (May 16, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/speech/Bernanke20060516a.htm (observing that, to the extent 
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appeared that a market-discipline approach worked well for the 
banking and securities-brokerage industries.123 In the sub-
prime context, however, this approach failed. To explain this 
failure, this Essay examines several hypotheses: 
Hypothesis: Certain foundations of a market-
discipline approach have rotted. 
Regulators implement a market-discipline approach by en-
suring that market participants have access to adequate infor-
mation about risks and by arranging incentives so that those 
who influence an institution’s behavior will suffer if that beha-
vior generates losses.124 In the recent financial crisis, however, 
disclosure inadequately conveyed information about the risks 
for various reasons,125 including that certain of the structured 
finance transactions were too complex to be adequately dis-
closed.126 Furthermore, the incentives of managers did not ap-
pear to be fully aligned with those of their institutions; manag-
ers would not necessarily suffer and, more importantly, they 
would not expect to suffer, if their behavior generated losses to 
their institutions.127 Additionally, in the context of systemic 
risk, there were fundamental misalignments between institu-
tional and financial market interests.128 
 
hedge funds are regulated solely through market discipline, government’s 
“primary task is to guard against a return of the weak market discipline that 
left major market participants overly vulnerable to market shocks”). 
 123. See, e.g., Helen A. Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying on Deposi-
tors to Control Bank Risks, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 129, 129–30 & n.1 (1986); Albert 
J. Boro, Jr., Comment, Banking Disclosure Regimes for Regulating Speculative 
Behavior, 74 CAL. L. REV. 431, 471 (1986). 
 124. See sources cited supra note 123; cf. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. 
of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the New York University Law 
School (Apr. 11, 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
speech/Bernanke20070411a.htm (“Receivership rules that make clear that in-
vestors will take losses when a bank becomes insolvent should increase the 
perceived risk of loss and thus also increase market discipline. . . . In the 
United States, the banking authorities have ensured that, in virtually all cas-
es, shareholders bear losses when a bank fails.”). 
 125. See generally supra Part II.A. 
 126. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text. 
 127. See supra notes 59–63 and accompanying text (observing potential 
agency-cost conflicts between investment bankers who structured, sold, or in-
vested in securities and the institutions for which they worked). 
 128. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text (arguing that struc-
tured finance may have dispersed subprime mortgage risk so widely that there 
was no clear incentive for any given investor to monitor it); see also infra text 
accompanying note 131 (observing that from the standpoint of systemic risk, a 
market-discipline approach is inherently suspect because no firm has suffi-
cient incentive to limit its risk taking in order to reduce the danger of systemic 
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Market discipline also may have failed due to the simple 
human greed of market participants.129 In the face of greed, 
market discipline is undermined by the availability heuristic130 
as well as the almost endemic shortage of funding for regulato-
ry monitoring.  
Market discipline alone, therefore, appears to be an insuf-
ficient approach. 
Hypothesis: At least regarding systemic risk, market 
discipline is inherently suspect because no firm has suf-
ficient incentive to limit its risk taking in order to re-
duce the danger of systemic contagion for other firms.  
Recall that the externalities of systemic failure include so-
cial costs that can extend far beyond market participants, re-
sulting in a type of tragedy of the commons.131 Thus, a firm 
that exercises market discipline by reducing its leverage will 
marginally reduce the overall potential for systemic risk; but if 
other firms do not also reduce their leverage, the first firm will 
likely lose net asset value relative to the other firms.132 
Summary: The preceding discussion shows that a market-
discipline approach must be supplemented and that market 
discipline is particularly suspect as a protection against sys-
temic risk. 
E. WHY DID THE RATING AGENCIES FAIL TO ANTICIPATE THE 
DOWNGRADES? 
This failure is particularly problematic due to the extent of 
investor overreliance on rating-agency ratings.133 For this fail-
ure, this Essay examines several hypotheses: 
Hypothesis: Rating agencies failed due to conflicts of 
interest regarding compensation. 
 
contagion for other firms). 
 129. See Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and 
Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1, 79 (1996) (discussing greed as a central 
factor that, in the hedge-fund context, transforms a successful hedging or 
moderately risky investment strategy into one of high-risk speculation). But cf. 
Bernanke, supra note 122 (suggesting a possible alternative psychological ex-
planation, at least in the case of the failure of market discipline with respect 
to LTCM’s investors, that those “[i]nvestors, perhaps awed by the reputations 
of LTCM’s principals, did not ask sufficiently tough questions about the risks 
that were being taken to generate the high returns”); supra note 39 and ac-
companying text (describing the “overreliance” hypothesis). 
 130. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
 131. See generally supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text. 
 132. See E-mail from Bookstaber, supra note 35. 
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 41–43. 
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Rating agencies are customarily paid by the issuer of se-
curities,134 but investors rely heavily on their ratings.135 This is 
technically a conflict, but it is not usually a material conflict 
because ratings are made independently of the fee received.136 
Furthermore, the reputational cost of a bad rating usually far 
exceeds the income received by giving the rating.137 
In the subprime crisis, though, the conflict would have 
been more material than normal because ratings were given to 
numerable issuances of CDO and ABS CDO securities, with 
each issuance (and rating) earning a separate fee. Assuming 
arguendo this created a material conflict, there is no easy solu-
tion. The question of who pays for a rating is difficult. Histori-
cally, rating agencies made their money by selling subscrip-
tions, but that may not generate sufficient revenue to allow 
rating agencies to hire the top-flight analysts needed to rate 
complex deals.138 And even if there was an easy way to get in-
vestors to pay for ratings, that might create the opposite incen-
tive: to err on the side of low ratings in order to increase the 
rate of return to investors, thereby increasing the cost of credit 
to companies.139 
Hypothesis: Rating agencies failed to foresee that the 
depth of the fall of the housing market could, and indeed 
did, exceed their worst-case modeled scenarios. 
This hypothesis begs the question of whether the rating 
agency models were reasonable, at least when viewed ex ante. 
That question is, effectively, identical to the earlier question of 
whether the failure by investors to envision the actual worst-
 
 134. Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating 
Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 15. 
 135. See id. at 3. 
 136. See id. at 16. 
 137. See id. at 14. 
 138. See id. at 16 n.94. For other possible ideas of how to avoid conflicts of 
interest in paying rating agencies, see Alan S. Blinder, Economic View: The 
Case for a Newer Deal, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2008, § 3 (Business), at 4 (noting 
ideas of his Princeton University colleagues, such as paying rating agencies 
with some of the securities they rate, or having a governmental entity pay rat-
ing agencies from the proceeds of a tax levied on issuers). Professor Blinder 
admits the difficulty of avoiding conflicts of interest, requesting that “[i]f you 
have a better idea, write your legislators.” Id.  
 139. Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict 
Between Current and Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1044, 1053–54 (2005) 
(observing that, to the extent ratings affect not only new investors but also ex-
isting investors, the analysis is complicated by the inherent conflict between 
those two sets of investors). 
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case scenario may have reflected, to some extent, a failure to 
take a sufficiently long view of risk.140 The earlier analysis pro-
posed two possible answers: that the failure simply reflected a 
failed judgment call, made ex ante, of what the worst-case 
could be like;141 and that the failure also may have reflected 
behavioral bias caused by the availability heuristic.142 
It is unlikely that the failure of rating-agency models re-
flected significant behavioral bias since these models are con-
structed by multiple trained and experienced analysts.143 To 
the extent the failure reflected a failed ex ante judgment call, 
this type of failure may be inevitable—even for rating agen-
cies—because the exercise of judgment involves an inherent 
risk of error. The hope is that rating agencies, through their in-
stitutional memory, will learn from experience and exercise 
better judgment in the future. 
At least one commentator argues that the rating agency 
failure likely reflected an underappreciation of how an over-
supply of mortgage money was artificially driving up home 
prices in subprime areas.144 This would be rather surprising, if 
true, given rating agency sophistication. It also is possible that 
the rating-agency models may have failed because of fraud in 
the borrower-income data.145 To this extent, rating agencies 
may be stymied because they have little alternative in most 
cases but to accept as true the data they receive.146 
Hypothesis: Rating agencies failed to fully appre-
ciate the correlation in subprime mortgage loans when 
analyzing CDOs, especially ABS CDOs. 
 
 140. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text. 
 141. See supra text accompanying notes 34–37. 
 142. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
 143. In order to qualify as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Or-
ganization (NRSRO), the rating agency must employ “an adequate number of 
staff members with the education and experience necessary to competently 
evaluate an issuer’s credit.” Arturo Estrella et al., Credit Ratings and Com-
plementary Sources of Credit Quality Information 51 (Bank for Int’l. Settle-
ments, Paper No. 3, 2000), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp3.pdf? 
noframes=1. But cf. Gerry McNamara & Paul Vaaler, A Management Re-
search Perspective On How and Why Credit Assessors ‘Get it Wrong’ When 
Judging Borrowers 3 (May 3, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with au-
thor) (suggesting that rating-agency models may have failed in part because of 
systematic biases resulting from behavioral factors). 
 144. See Mian & Sufi, supra note 36, at 24–25. 
 145. See supra note 71. 
 146. See Schwarcz, supra note 134, at 6 (observing that rating agencies do 
not, and cannot pragmatically, rate for fraud). 
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Early CDOs and ABS CDOs had highly diversified under-
lying assets.147 Later CDOs and ABS CDOs were still diversi-
fied but were more susceptible to a finance-based link in which 
prices of the underlying assets start to move in lockstep as in-
vestors hedge their exposure to those assets.148 Furthermore, 
even though later ABS CDOs had significant diversification in 
the ABS and MBS securities included therein, there was an 
underlying correlation in the subprime mortgage loans backing 
the different MBS securities. Rating agencies, however, contin-
ued to use historical cash-flow models which did not anticipate 
the degree of price convergence or correlation of subprime 
loans.149 
Summary: Rating agencies obviously failed to anticipate 
the worst-case scenario represented by the subprime meltdown. 
Although this failure might have resulted in part from conflicts 
of interest in the way rating agencies are paid, that is unlikely 
since payment is independent of the rating. Furthermore, the 
reputational cost of issuing bad ratings usually far exceeds the 
payment received. In any event, there is no easy solution to the 
dilemma of how rating agencies can be paid without creating 
conflicts with either issuers or investors. 
A more likely explanation for the failure is that ratings are 
judgment calls by human beings, and mistakes inevitably will 
be made.150 One might argue that rating agencies should be 
 
 147. One explanation for the erosion of diversification is the growth of syn-
thetics. See infra note 145. 
 148. See also Jody Shenn, Overlapping Subprime Exposure Mask Risks of 
CDOs, Moody’s Says, BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 4, 2007, http://www.bloomberg 
.com/apps/news?pid=20601170&sid=aszosOrxVmjk&refer=home (reporting that 
the growth of synthetics in the CDO market has created situations where as-
sets and the synthetic products derived from those assets are in the same 
CDO, causing the CDO to be exposed to the same risk twice); see also E-mail 
from Bookstaber, supra note 35 (discussing this link). 
 149. See The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Structured Finance 
Market: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and 
Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th 
Cong. 63 (2007) (statement of Mark Adelson, Member, Adelson & Jacob Con-
sulting, LLC). Another possible hypothesis is that there has been rating-
agency “grade inflation.” See Charles W. Calomiris, Not (Yet) a Minsky Mo-
ment, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, at 18, Oct. 5, 2007, http://www.aei 
.org/doclib/20071010_Not(Yet)AMinskyMoment.pdf (“Grade inflation has been 
concentrated particularly in securitized products, where the demand is espe-
cially driven by regulated intermediaries.”). However, even if there was grade 
inflation, the consequences are unclear since investors were probably not 
misled but simply did not care so long as the securities purchased were in fact 
rated investment grade. 
 150. S&P Announces New Actions to Strengthen the Ratings Process, CRE-
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more conservative, or that government should mandate more 
conservative ratings, but overprotection itself has a cost. If rat-
ing agencies had used more conservative models requiring 
greater overcollateralization, those models would have been de-
cried as wasteful if housing prices had not collapsed. 
Whatever the reasons for the failure by rating agencies to 
anticipate the downgrades, it should be noted that rating agen-
cies may not be perfect but the idea of rating agencies is impor-
tant. Individual investors face relatively high costs to assess 
the creditworthiness of complex securities. Rating agencies can 
make this assessment on behalf of many individual investors, 
thereby achieving an economy of scale.151 
  CONCLUSION   
This Essay has suggested various insights into protecting 
financial markets. Additional insight can be gained by recogniz-
ing that most of the causes of the anomalies and failures can be 
divided into three categories: (i) conflicts; (ii) complacency; or 
(iii) complexity.152 
The first category, conflicts, is the most tractable. Once 
identified, conflicts can often be managed. For example, this 
Essay has shown that the excesses of the originate-and-
distribute model can be managed by aligning the interests of 
mortgage lenders and investors by requiring the former to re-
tain a risk of loss. Some conflicts, though, may be harder to 
manage in practice, such as conflicts in how rating agencies are 
paid. 
The second category, complacency, is less tractable because 
solutions to complacent behavior can require changing human 
nature, an obviously impossible task. After a crisis, everyone 
focuses on avoiding that crisis in the future (though hopefully 
also avoiding the all-too-human tendency to fall into the rut of 
fighting the “last war”153). But bounded rationality makes in-
vestors forget such crises with alacrity.154 
 
DIT WK., Feb. 13, 2008, at 12 (proposing various procedural review steps to 
minimize human failure in the ratings process and to increase the efficiency 
of, and public confidence in, credit ratings). 
 151. See supra note 43. 
 152. I am grateful to Professor Jonathan Lipson for suggesting these cate-
gories. 
 153. Systemic Risk Hearing, supra note 2, at 27 (statement of Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Stanley A. Star Professor of Law and Business, Duke University). 
 154. Cf. supra note 51 and accompanying text (observing that investors 
quickly forget past financial crises and “go for the gold”). 
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The subprime mortgage crisis appears to have discredited, 
though, at least one form of complacency: widespread investor 
obsession with securities that have no established market and, 
instead, are valued by being marked-to-model. 
Other forms of complacency are rational and can only be 
addressed through structural changes. For example, investors 
will almost certainly continue to overrely on rating-agency rat-
ings, so long as the cost of making independent credit investi-
gations remains high. If rating agencies continue to provide un-
reliable ratings, perhaps investors should consider whether 
innovative collective-action approaches, such as collective credit 
determinations by groups of investors, might prove more relia-
ble.155 
The third category, complexity, is least tractable.156 Com-
plexity can deprive investors and other market participants of 
the information needed for markets to operate effectively. It 
was responsible for the failure of disclosure in the subprime 
crisis. Even beyond disclosure, complexity is increasingly a me-
taphor for the modern financial system and its potential for 
failure, illustrated further by the tight coupling that causes 
markets to move rapidly into a crisis mode; the potential con-
vergence in quantitatively constructed investment strategies; 
the layers inserted between obligors on loans and other finan-
cial assets and the assets’ beneficial owners, which make it dif-
ficult to work out underlying defaults;157 and the problem of 
adverse selection, in which investors, uncertain which invest-
ments or counterparties are sound, begin to shun all invest-
ments. Solving problems of financial complexity may well be 
the ultimate twenty-first century market goal.158 
These categories are broad, but they do not capture every-
thing. One might propose, for example, a fourth category: cu-
pidity. Greed, however, is so ingrained in human nature and so 
 
 155. Collective approaches, though, might face potential antitrust hurdles. 
 156. Cf. Michael Mandel, The Economy’s Safety Valve, BUS. WK., Oct. 22, 
2007, at 36 (“In today’s complex and globally integrated financial markets, it’s 
almost impossible for regulators to plug every hole.”). 
 157. See, e.g., Interview with Hirsch, supra note 102 (observing that, be-
cause of these layers, the “instruments were so complex that no one followed 
the trail”). 
 158. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Complexity as a Catalyst of Market 
Failure: A Law and Engineering Inquiry 2 n.5 (SSRN Working Paper No. 
1240863, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id= 1240863. 
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intertwined with the other categories that it adds little insight 
to view it as a separate category.  
These categories also do not capture the problem of system-
ic risk, whose uniqueness arises from a type of tragedy of the 
commons. Because the benefits of exploiting finite capital re-
sources accrue to individual market participants whereas the 
costs of exploitation are distributed among an even wider class 
of persons, market participants have insufficient incentive to 
internalize their externalities. Government, however, can pro-
vide solutions, such as creating a liquidity provider of last 
resort to purchase securities in collapsing markets (albeit at 
profitable discounts to minimize moral hazard) in order to mi-
tigate market instability that would lead to systemic col-
lapse.159 
A final possible inquiry is to ask whether periodic financial 
market instabilities are harmful or, in the long run, possibly 
helpful to the economy. For example, perhaps the subprime fi-
nancial crisis, or something like it, was needed to turn around 
the incentive-distorting liquidity glut of the past few years.160 
Financial market instabilities are believed to be acceptable if 
they are “relatively limited in scope,” even if deep in their nar-
row impact.161 Indeed, such instabilities “may serve as critical 
safety valves.”162 There are, however, two concerns. On a dis-
tributional level, market instabilities impact people, and in the 
subprime crisis many of those affected have been “low-income” 
individuals.163 On a more fundamental level, there is “no guar-
antee that the next crisis won’t spread and turn into the Big 
One, which undermines the whole financial system.”164 
 
 159. See Schwarcz, supra note 66, at 241–42. 
 160. Cf. Balakrishnan et al., supra note 72, at 8 (discussing the liquidity 
glut). 
 161. Mandel, supra note 156, at 34. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 36–37. That many of the affected individuals have been “low-
income” individuals does not conflict with this Essay’s earlier observation that 
QIBs are the investors who lost the most money in the subprime crisis. See 
supra text accompanying note 64. Low-income individuals lost money not as 
investors but as foreclosed homeowners. 
 164. Mandel, supra note 153, at 37; see also Vikas Bajaj & Louise Story, 
Mortgage Crisis Spreads Beyond Subprime Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, 
at A1 (discussing the spread of the subprime crisis to other markets); cf. Mi-
chael D. Bordo et al., Real Versus Pseudo-International Systemic Risk: Some 
Lessons from History 10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
5371, 1995), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w5371.pdf (discussing 
how normal market expansions and contractions can turn into market crises 
in situations of “speculative mania”). 
